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In many jurisdictions in the United States, the final word in
disciplinary actions involving police officers is not had by the
chief of police, the mayor, or a civilian review board, but by an
arbitrator. Using binding arbitration as a means of resolving
disputes over attempts to fire or suspend sworn officers is very
common, especially in many larger departments. There may be
great differences among departments in terms of arbitrators' in-
volvement, for example, which actions are, or are not cogniza-
ble before an arbitrator, at what stage in the process does the
arbitrator enter the scene, etc. However, a key shared feature is
the commitment by both management and the officers, through
their unions or associations, to the principle of binding arbitra-
tion. Both parties agree to abide by the arbitrators' decisions.
The losing party generally has only very narrow grounds to chal-
lenge an arbitration decision through a civil suit.'
. Executive Director, Chicago Police Board; Adjunct Lecturer, Department of
Political Science, Northwestern University. The opinions expressed in this article are
solely those of the author, and do not represent the position or policy of the Chicago
Police Board, the Chicago Police Department, or the City of Chicago.
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Therefore, in a very real sense, to get a feel for how a police
department takes disciplinary action, one must look at the final
outcomes of the process. What a police chief or review board
may order and what an arbitrator may ultimately decide can be
very different.
The objective of this article is to present an empirical
evaluation of how a police executive's disciplinary actions
against a large pool of officers have been affected by arbitrators'
decisions. This study focuses on the Chicago Police Department
and covers the years 1990-1993. A total of 328 disciplinary ac-
tions were decided by binding arbitration during that period.
In addition, under a new process started in July 1993, 205 disci-
plinary actions have been reviewed by arbitrators for non-
binding advisory opinions as of July 1995. These two distinct
data sets demonstrate remarkably similar patterns of outcomes;
collectively, the discipline imposed upon Chicago police officers
is routinely cut in half by arbitrators. This pattern recurs de-
spite an elaborate, lengthy review process and close scrutiny be-
fore the suspension of an officer is ordered.
This extraordinary even-handedness of outcomes raises se-
rious, basic questions about the propriety of the arbitration pro-
cess. Most studies of arbitration focus on precedential
decisions. Although it is rare to have empirical analysis of a uni-
verse of decisions from one setting, this study closely scrutinizes
one such pool of decisions. This study has particular signifi-
cance because the underlying cases involve allegations of police
misconduct that often arise from the highly charged, high-
profile area of excessive force allegations.
II. POLICE DISCIPLINE AND CIVIAN REvIEw
Across the United States, the issue of police discipline has
been interwoven with the question of civilian review. For years,
in many cities, citizens and community groups have pressured
municipal authorities to establish civilian review boards. Some
of the many jurisdictions which have gone through this debate
include Denver,2 Houston,3 San Jose,4 and Boston.5 The stated
' Mark Eddy, Bill Exempiafies Art of Politics: Compromise Key to Sandos' Plan, DENVER
PosT, Aug. 31, 1992, at 1-A.
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rationale is often the same from city to city: citizens' complaints
of police misconduct, when investigated by police internal af-
fairs officers, are not handled properly. In calling for civilian
review boards in New Orleans and in other Louisiana jurisdic-
tions, the chair of the Coalition of Concerned Black Ministers
called the existing police investigative process "ajoke. It's a case
of the fox guarding the henhouse."6 A common perception is
that the police cannot be trusted to investigate themselves, es-
pecially when the allegation is use of excessive force. For exam-
ple, police shootings of several car-theft suspects in Newark,
New Jersey led community activists to call for a civilian com-
plaint review board. The activists claimed that the city's Police
Director allowed his officers to operate "with impunity."" It is
argued that only through civilian review, with a panel of citizens
responding to public complaints, can the police be held ac-
countable for their actions.9
There has been a slow but steady trend to establish civilian
review boards in many cities across the United States. ' There is
no single, generally used model of civilian review boards. Pan-
els vary widely in their composition, jurisdiction, and authority.
Some jurisdictions have panels composed entirely of citizens
while others have panels composed jointly of officers and citi-
zens. In some cities, the panels may undertake their own inves-
tigations, while others limit their scope to reviewing the police
department's own internal investigations. Some panels have ju-
Raequel Roberts, Anniversary of Slaying Sparks Rallies: Justice Committee Recalls Ida
Delaney, HOUSTON Posr, Oct. 30, 1990, atA12.
' Dan Turner, San Jose Council Rejects Civilian Police Review, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 19,
1992, at B7.
" Michael Grunwald, Critics Urge Review Board for Hub Police, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug.
29, 1995, at 31.
6 Ed Anderson, Ministers Seeking Police Oversight, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Jan.
29, 1993, at B1.
7 JEROME H. SKOLNICK & JAMEsJ. FYF, AOV TmHE LAW: POLICE AND THE EXCESSIVE
UsE oFFoRCE 226 (1993).
' Evelyn Nieves, Newark Police Shootings Revive Call for a Civilian Review Board, N. Y.
TaMES, Sept. 11, 1992, atB5.
g Chris Black, Civilian Role in Police Reviews Expanding BOSTON GLOBE,July 28, 1991,
at 1.
,o See generally SAMUEL WALKER & BETSY WRIGHT, POLICE EXECUTIVE RESEARCH
FORUM, CTIZENREVIEW OF THE POLICE 1994: A NATIONALSURVEY (1995).
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risdiction over all allegations of officer misconduct, while others
are limited to instances involving allegations of verbal or physi-
cal abuse. Ultimately, the most significant variable is the panel's
authority to discipline officers. Can the panel, on its own
authority, suspend or fire an officer, or can the panel make only
a recommendation to the chief of police?
Whether the disciplinary action emanates from the chief of
police after the traditional investigation by sworn personnel, or
whether the action stems from a citizens' review board, a crucial
factor is the appeals mechanism. For discipline to be meaning-
ful, it must be real. Penalties that are perceived as paper actions
only, unlikely to withstand the appeals process, are also unlikely
to either redirect the errant officer or deter other officers. The
police subculture is characterized by a strong degree of suspi-
cion" and cynicism. Given such cynicism, in order for a disci-
plinary system to be effective, it needs to be unambiguously
perceived as one capable of making decisions that withstand
challenges.
The power to discipline an officer is crucial to police man-
agers. Typically through such action an officer's misconduct
can be corrected and other officers can be deterred from simi-
lar action. Other resources that can be used by police manage-
ment to restrain an overly aggressive or errant officer are very
limited. Civil service regulations and union contracts not only
severely restrict a police chief s ability to reward exemplary per-
formance through promotions, transfers, reassignments, pay in-
creases, or bonuses, but also restrict the police chief's ability to
impose sanctions for poor performance. Because police and lo-
cal prosecuting attorneys cooperate closely, criminal prosecu-
tion of officer misconduct is typically limited to a very small
number of the most blatant cases." Civil lawsuits against the po-
lice for misconduct, filed by persons alleging civil rights viola-
tions, are more significant to police management than to
"JEROME H. SKOLmNC, JuSTICE WrrIHouT TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN DEMOCRATIC
SOCIETY 43 (3rd ed. 1994).
12 ARTHUR NIEDERHOFFER, BEHIND THE SHIELD: THE POLICE IN URBAN SOCIETY 9, 46-
48 (Anchor ed. 1969).
13 SeeSKOLNICK & FFE, supra note 7, at 199.
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individual officers. Typically, a jurisdiction is obligated to pro-
vide legal representation to an accused officer in a suit arising
from the actions the officer took under color of law, whether on
or off duty. The employing jurisdiction is usually obligated to
indemnify the officer for any damages awarded in court.14 An
officer may be personally liable only if punitive damages are im-
posed, which is an infrequent occurrence.
With criminal prosecution, civil suits, and managerial pre-
rogatives severely limited as tools for correcting errant officers,
disciplinary action remains the most potent means to get an of-
ficer's attention. The threat of losing one's job, or losing a
week's or a month's pay while on suspension, is powerful and
intimidating.
For rank and file officers, the advent of a civilian review
board raises the specter that civilians will be second-guessing of-
ficers' actions and imposing discipline. 5 For officers, the term
"civilian" in this context is almost a pejorative: civilians are out-
side the police subculture and do not understand the types of
people (sociopaths, drunks, etc.) with whom the police must
routinely deal. 6 A national police union representative noted
that police feel it is difficult for civilians to understand the pres-
sures under which police operate. 7 Police officers find it espe-
cially threatening that such second guessing will be done most
prominently in cases involving the use of force, which goes to
the core definition of a police officer's role.'
These arguments have been fought out in city after city
across the United States whenever the creation of a civilian re-
view board is proposed. Typically, police unions, associations,
and their allies are opposed to creating any such civilian review
boards while community organizations and civil rights groups
are in support of having such boards. Police union opposition
to such boards can be strident. Donald L. Murray, the head of
4 See, e.g., 65 I-. CoMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1-4-5, 5/1-4-6 (West 1993).
," See SKoLmCm& FYFE, supra note 7, at 221, 226.
,6 ANTHONY V. BOUZA, THE PoIucE MysTQUE: AN INSIDER'S LOOK AT COPS, CRIME,
AND THE CRMiNALJUSnCE SYSTEM 4-7 (1990).
" David Rohde, Civilian Review Boards Strain for Funds to Watch Cops, JHRIMM Sca.
MONITOR, Aug. 29, 1994, at 1.
" CARLB. KLOcKARS, THE IDEA OF POLICE 9-10 (1985).
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the Boston Police Patrolmen's Association, called the creation
of a community appeals board "the ruination of the Boston Po-
lice Department. I'm very disheartened. It's a very sad day.
And I feel I've been raped and sodomized."19 In New York City
in 1966, the police officers association was crucial in leading the
electoral campaign that successfully enacted a charter referen-
dum, strongly opposed by Mayor John Lindsay, to bar any such
review board.
20
There is often a racial dimension to this conflict. In many
major cities, Hispanic and black police officers comprise much
smaller proportions of the police forces than of the populations
within theirjurisdictions. In 1992, of the ten largest cities in the
United States, only one, Los Angeles, had the same proportion
of African-Americans both within the population at large and
among its officers. The other nine cities all had significant un-S 21
der-representation. For these same cities, the under-
representation of Hispanic officers was even more pronounced.
In 1992, none of these ten cities had a proportion of Hispanic
officers that equaled or exceeded two-thirds of the proportion
of the city's Hispanic population. This racial divisiveness was
illustrated in Houston, when in 1989 the Houston City Council
voted, along racial lines, against the establishment of a civilian
review board. Council members played down the racial split,
but the Council's one Hispanic and four black members were
the only ones to support the mayor on this issue.2
Often the issue of civilian review becomes a very hot politi-
cal item. In 1992, thousands of off-duty New York police officers
staged a demonstration that verged on a riot to voice their op-
position to Mayor David Dinkins' plans for such a board.24 In
San Jose, California, citizen review advocates, many Hispanic,
"John Ellement, Roache Creates Appeals Board, BOSTON GLOBE,Jan. 18, 1992, at 1.
"See SKOLNiCK & FYFE, supra note 7, at 221-22.
"BUREAU OF JusTncE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T. JuSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRUMNAL
JusTiE STATISTICS 49 (1994).
22I at 50.
"David Plesa & Andrew Kirtzman, Council Blocks Police Review Panel; City to Seek Al-
ternatives Brown Favors, HOUSTON POST, Nov. 30, 1989, at Al.
" James C. McKinley, Jr., Officers Rally and Dinkins is Their Target, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
17, 1992, at B1.
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wanted a full civilian review board. The police chief, citing the
potential for a witch-hunt atmosphere, threatened to resign if
the proposal was enacted. As a compromise, a lesser plan,
which created an independent auditor, was enacted. Commu-
nity groups vowed to take their efforts for a more comprehen-
sive review board to the ballot.2 In Syracuse, New York, there
was a divisive dispute as to whether or not a civilian review board
should be created. The local police chief and the Republican
leader of the city's Democrat-controlled Common Council were
among those opposed to the creation of such a board; con-
versely, community leaders and civil liberties advocates sup-
ported its creation.26
Controversy does not necessarily end once local authorities
have decided to create a citizen review board. In Denver, after a
review panel was established, the Police Protective Association
(the officers' union) advised its members not to honor subpoe-
nas issued by the city's civilian review board. A Denver County
Judge upheld the board's subpoena powers, stating that without
such powers, the commission would be gutted.27
These disputes can highlight racial divisions between the
police forces and the populations whom they police. Thus, in
Springfield, Massachusetts, the local chapter of the NAACP
threatened to initiate a grass-roots effort to police the police if a
proposed review board was not granted authority to discipline
officers and oversee investigations. This movement arose in the
aftermath of the fatal shooting of a black motorist by a white po-
lice officer, and was furher aggravated by an officers' party to
celebrate a grand jury's decision to clear the officer of criminal
wrongdoing. 2  The County Executive of Prince George's
County, Maryland, proposed adding a civilian to the board of
police officers then empowered to review complaints of police
Dan Turner, San Jose Council Rejects Civilian Police Reviews, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 19,
1992, at B7.
"Lindsey Gruson, Syracuse Grapples with Debate over Civilian Review of Police, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 3, 1992, at B1.
' Howard Pankratz, Judge Orders Cops to Comply: Civilian Panel has Subpoena Powers,
DENVERPoST, Nov. 30, 1995, atB1.
" Geeta Anand, Civilian Review Proposed for Springfield Police: Fatal Shooting of Black
DriverLed to Protests, BOSrON GLOBE, July 11, 1994, at 13.
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misconduct. This -proposed addition was acknowledged as a
step that would help to counter the negative image of the police
held by segments of the county's black population. The mem-
bers of the union representing the county's police officers voted
their unanimous opposition to this proposal.2
In contrast to the above incidents, the absence of contro-
versy during the creation of a board in Omaha, Nebraska, was
deemed newsworthy.30
In the public debates on this disciplinary process, one major
factor is typically not given the attention it merits: the ultimate
role of outside arbitration in disciplinary actions against officers.
It is crucial to understand this role. In the end, outside arbitra-
tion can negate the police disciplinary process, whether that
process takes place through internal mechanisms, or through a
civilian review board.3'
Therein lies a crucial, and, heretofore unexamined ques-
tion: how do arbitrators decide questions of police discipline? If
the objective of citizens' groups is to hold officers accountable
for their misconduct through disciplinary actions, and if the of-
ficers' objective is to avoid disciplinary action, then focusing at-
tention on the merits of the civilian review process versus
internal investigations misses the point. The process of who inves-
tigates and how, while symbolically significant, is less crucial than
what actually happens. To that end, this article documents how
a large pool of disciplinary suspensions of police officers, im-
posed after lengthy review processes, has been subsequently af-
fected by arbitrators' decisions.
III. POLICE, UNIONS, AND ARBITRATION
Recent years have not been kind to the organized labor
movement in the United States. In 1954, labor union members
29Keith Harriston & Debbie M. Price, Glendening Supports Adding Civilian to Police
Review Board, WAsH. PoST, July 28, 1989, at C1.
" A Review Board Without a Ripple? Omaha Proves that It Can Be Done, LAw
ENFoRcEMENT NEws, July/Aug. 1993, at 1.
"' The controversy over the establishment of a civilian review system in Houston is
one exception to this statement. Media coverage of the dispute noted, with analysis
and numbers, that "arbitrators have done well by the cops." Steve Friedman, Disci-
pline Procedures Take Time, HOUSTON POST, Nov. 19, 1989, at A37.
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composed 35.3% of America's non-farm work force. By 1993,
they composed only 15.8% of the work force." During that time
span, the raw number of union members actually declined even
as the work force more than doubled in size."
One major exception to this general decline has been the
public sector. Employees in many jurisdictions are now mem-
bers of collective bargaining units. In 1993, 36.7% of govern-
ment workers were members of unions.-" Police forces across
the country have shared in this growth. While comprehensive
data are lacking,-M one survey ofjurisdictions with populations of
ten thousand or more indicated 58% of these departments had
at least some of their members in unions.37 At the state and lo-
cal levels, there are an estimated 604,000 police officers in the
United States. The Fraternal Order of Police represents
250,000 of these officers.s9 Other police unions represent many
additional officers. Some of these unions, such as the New York
City Patrolmen's Benevolent Association and the Los Angeles
Police Protective Association, are free-standing local organiza-
tions, and they are not part of a national union. In major cities-
those with the greatest numbers of officers-unionization is al-
most the norm. New York City, Chicago, Los Angeles, Philadel-
phia, Phoenix, Boston, and Washington all have unions or
associations representing officers.0
32BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACr OF THE
UNITED STATES 228 (1956).
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRAC OF THE
UNITED STATES 436 (1993).
Id.; BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 32, at 198, 228.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 33, at 436.
The fragmented, local nature of policing makes it difficult to assemble compre-
hensive data on police. For example, surveys as to the number of police departments in
the United States have produced estimates from 15,000 to 20,000. See SAMUEL
WALKER, THE POuE INAMERICA: AN INTRODUCTION 37 (2d ed. 1992).
37 See generaly EVELINA MOULDER, U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSnCE, POLICE SALARIES 1993:
SPECIAL DATA ISSUE (1993).
See BUREAU OFJuSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 21, at 45.
"See Rohde, supra note 17, at 1.
,0 "Associations" or "protective leagues" were formed by officers in numerous juris-
dictions where state or local laws barred officers from forming or joining unions.
Over the years, many of these associations have come to perform almost all of the
functions of unions, including negotiating collective bargaining agreements.
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Unionization comes with a contract. While these contracts
may resolve some disputes, they open the door to the creation
of new disputes. A collective bargaining agreement will nor-
mally provide for a mechanism to resolve disputes in contract
interpretation and application. One common model for dis-
pute resolution is the arbitration of grievances. One survey of
major private sector collective bargaining agreements found
that almost 96% provided for arbitration as the final step in the
grievance process.41 If an employee is dissatisfied with the disci-
plinary action to be imposed, a grievance is filed. With whom
the grievance shall be filed, and how it shall be resolved, are
42specified in the collective bargaining agreement. The collec
tive bargaining agreement may typically detail various pre-
arbitration procedures to be applied in an effort to resolve the
dispute by negotiation between the parties, prior to its presenta-
tion to an outside, impartial arbitrator.43 Typically, the contract
will provide for binding arbitration. The parties agree to honor
the arbitrator's decision as final, with no appeals process.
Police departments' disciplinary processes are typically
complex and lengthy, with large differences across cities. A
sample process will be detailed later in this article." However,
in many cities, some, if not all, disciplinary actions that the chief
of police may wish to take against an officer are subject to an
arbitrator's jurisdiction. Chicago, Boston, Cleveland, Houston
and Pittsburgh are just a few of the major U.S. cities in which
arbitration is at least a partial means to adjudicate certain disci-
plinary actions. New York City's police unions successfully pres-
sured the state legislature into passing a bill that would take
disciplinary actions out of the Department's control and require
mandatory arbitration. Governor Pataki eventually vetoed the
bill, in the face of strong support from the police unions.4 In
Chicago, the collective bargaining agreement specifies that no
41 See ELKOURi & ELKouRI, supra note 1, at 6.
4Id. at 153-55.
43 Id. at 165-69.
44 See infra, Part V.
4To Albany: Don't Undermine the NY.P.D., N.Y. TIMS, June 29, 1995, at A20; James
Dao, Pataki Vetoes Bill as a Threat to New York Police Merger, N. Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1995, at
Al.
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officer may be disciplined by management except for 'just
cause."4 Thus, arbitrations center on the issue of whether or
not the Department can meet its burden to convince the arbi-
trator that just cause did in fact exist for taking disciplinary ac-
tion.
There have been recent instances in which arbitration deci-
sions have inflamed public opinion. In St. Paul, Minnesota, an
officer pled guilty to misdemeanor charges stemming from an
off-duty sexual assault. He had exposed himself to a fourteen-
year-old babysitter at his home and fondled her. The police de-
partment fired the officer, who then was restored to duty by an
arbitrator. The arbitrator found the department's penalty of
discharge too harsh, citing the officer's past job performance,
remorseful attitude, and a positive report from a therapist the
officer subsequently saw for counseling.4 7 In Pittsburgh, Penn-
sylvania, an officer faced criminal charges for indecent assault
arising from an on-duty incident. He was discharged by the po-
lice department. An arbitration panel overturned the officer's
discharge, and reduced the penalty to a suspension of six
months and two years probation. One arbitrator concluded the
incident was not an assault, and stated the officer was "not the
first man to lose his head" over sex.48 A Hartford, Connecticut
officer twice struck a handcuffed student in the face at a near-
riotous beer party at the University of Hartford. The incident
was videotaped and the resulting complaint led to the officer's
discharge. The officer filed a grievance. While the Connecticut
Board of Mediation and Arbitration did not dictate the officer's
reinstatement, its suggestion that the police chief negotiate the
disciplinary action with the police union led to the officer's re-
instatement. Reports at that time indicated only two other offi-
cers had been fired by the Hartford Police Department for use
of excessive force in twenty years, and both of those officers
4 Agreement Between the City of Chicago Department of Police and the Fraternal
Order of Police Chicago Lodge No. 7, effective through June 30, 1995, § 8.1 (on file
with Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology).
17 Conrad deFiebre, Ruling on Convicted Cop's Job Explained; Work Record and Treat-
ment Cited, MIONEAPouS/ST. PAuLSTARTIuB., Aug. 17, 1993, at lB.
' Jan Ackerman, Woman Testifies in Assault Case; Says City Officer Came to Her Home
and Attacked Her, PrrrSBURGH PosT-GAZETE, June 21, 1995, at B-2.
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were also subsequently reinstated 9 In Oregon, two state police
troopers were discharged as the result of a 1992 incident in
which they had sex with a woman in their police car while on
duty. An arbitrator subsequently reversed those disciplinary ac-
tions.J These cases are exceptional, not because the police
chiefs' decisions were overturned, but because the arbitrators'
decisions became publicly known and attracted wide attention.
IV. ARBITRATION DECISIONS: AN OVERVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
The labor law literature gives extensive coverage to arbitra-
tion issues. There have been a number of studies which have
examined pools of arbitration decisions, with varied research
objectives. Bemmels studied 557 grievance arbitrations, and
concluded that male arbitrators were more likely to sustain the
grievances of female grievants than those of male grievants.5'
Karim examined a group of 102 public sector discharge cases
subsequently taken to arbitration.5 2 A forty year overview exam-
ined more than 1,700 discharge cases concluded by arbitration,
selected from three separate time spans. Building on two prior
studies, the authors added 300 new decisions to the pool of de-
cisions analyzed . All of these studies examined cases involving
numerous employers.
Rahnama-Moghadam et al. examined a pool of arbitration
decisions arising from incidents of insubordination and absen-
teeism, limiting their study to public sector actions only. 4
There was a noticeable trend for unions to win in insubordina-
" Blanca M. Quintanilla, Chief Reinstates Officer Fired for Hitting Student, HAIoRD
COuRANT, -Sept. 29, 1992, at Al; Who's Running the Police Department?, HAITFORD
COuRANT, Sept. 30, 1992, at B16.
" Oregon SP Code of Ethics Stirs Up Short-Lived Tempest, LAw ENFoRCEMENT NEWs, Aug.
20, 1995, at 1.
" Brian Bemmels, Gender Effects in Grievance Arbitration, 29 INDuS. & LAB. R.L. REV.
513 (1990).
"Ahmad P. Karim, Arbitrator Considerations In Modijing Discharge Decisions in the
Public Sector, 22J. COLLECTVE NEGOATIONS IN THE PUB. SECTOR 245, 248 (1993).
" Ken Jennings et al, The Arbitration of Discharge Cases: A Forty-Year Perspective, 38
LAB. LJ. 33, 34 (1987).
" Mashalah Rahnama-Moghadam et al., The Arbitration Of Disciplinay Matters In the
Public Sector: Does Objective Evidence Make A Difference?, 21 J. CoLLEGVE NEGOTIATIONS
INTHE PUB. SECrOR 151, 152-53 (1992).
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tion cases, but for management to win on absenteeism issues.55
This led the authors to conclude that in cases where there is ob-
jective evidence, the burden of proof is more easily discharged .5
Malinowski examined a pool of 159 discharge cases, drawn from
the private sector, in which employees who had been discharged
were subsequently reinstated by arbitration decisions.
These-and other cases not cited-all share one factor in
common. The universe of decisions, from which the cases stud-
ied were drawn, was defined as consisting of arbitration deci-
sions published in the Bureau of National Affairs' Labor
Arbitration Reports. Yet this publication, by its own expressed
criteria, explicitly excludes from publication those cases which
turn on the question of which witness(es) are to be believed as
to the facts, or those cases deemed to be "routine."" Thus,
these studies, which attempt to ascertain certain typical trends or
characteristics of arbitrators' decisions, do so by examining de-
cisions culled from published reports which are by definition
atypical.-
Other studies have limited their scope to public sector or-
ganizations only, with access to broader data pools. Sherr exam-
ined public sector arbitration awards to ascertain factors
associated with employers' and unions' utilization of attorneys
in arbitrations.60 Franklin and Stephens conducted a survey of
police officers' and fire fighters' associations in Texas to ascer-
tain their support for, and utilization .of, then-recently enacted
statutory changes allowing access to arbitration.61  Neither of
55 Id.
56id.
17 Arthur Anthony Malinowski, An Empirical Analysis Of Discharge Cases and the Work
History OfEmployees Reinstated by Labor Arbitrators, AB.J., March, 1981, at 32-33.
99 LAB. ARB. REP. v (1993).
"Less commonly, studies may utilize arbitration decisions reported in Commerce
Clearing House Labor Arbitration Awards. This series also screens decisions to accept
and publish only those of more general interest, although the publication does not
state its criteria with the same clarity as does Labor Arbitration Reports.
6Mitchell A. Sherr, Legal Representation Of Public Sector Employers and Unions in
Grievance Arbitration, 23J. COLECTrivE NEGOTIATIONS IN THE PUB. SECTOR 203 (1994).
"' Geralyn McClure Franklin & Elvis C. Stephens, Public Sector Labor Relations in
Texas: An Examination of the Appeals Process for Fire Fighters and Police Officers Covered Un-




these studies, however, examined pools of actual decisions to
ascertain patterns of outcomes.
My analysis can be distinguished from these other studies by
its utilization of all disciplinary arbitrations drawn from the Chi-
cago Police Department during a four year period.
V. PoLIcE DISCIPLINE IN CHICAGO
The focus of this study is arbitrators' reviews of disciplinary
actions against Chicago police officers during the years 1990
through 1993. First, however, an explanation of the disciplinary
process in Chicago is required. The general process, as out-
lined below, applies to all employees of the Chicago Police De-
partment (the "Department"), both civilian and sworn,
although the vast majority of employees are sworn officers. It is
their actions which are of greatest concern to the public, for it is
the sworn officers who have been empowered to use coercive
force if they feel it necessary to do so. Therefore, the following
discussion refers to officers only. The procedures for civilian
employees are essentially similar, although there are some mi-
nor differences. 62
The disciplinary process starts through a Complaint Regis-
ter (CR) investigation. With the exception of those problems
dealt with under Summary Punishment,63 all complaints of mis-
conduct committed by either sworn or civilian employees, on or
off duty, begin with the lodging of a complaint with the De-
partment's Office of Professional Standards (OPS). This is a
unit of the Chicago Police Department staffed by civilians. OPS
issues a Complaint Register Number (CR number) to each in-
coming complaint, regardless of the nature of the allegation or
62 The most significant difference concerns the scope of disciplinary matters sub-
ject to arbitrations. Sworn officers below the rank of sergeant may grieve suspensions
up to 30 days in length. As specified in the applicable collective bargaining agree-
ments, most civilian members may grieve suspensions of 10 days or less. Sworn mem-
bers of sergeants' rank or higher do not at this time have any right to use the
grievance/arbitration procedures.
0SIn addition to CR investigations, a Chicago officer may also be given minor sus-
pensions (usually one or two days) under a process known as Summary Punishment.
This usually deals with minor infractions (late for roll call, improper uniform). A
suspension issued under this process is not subject to arbitration unless it is the offi-
cer's fourth infraction in 12 months. See Agreement, supra note 46, § 7.2 at 11.
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the source-a citizen, a supervisor, or for that matter, any mem-
ber of the Department. Under certain conditions, anonymous
complaints are also accepted for investigation. CR numbers are
obtained by supervisors for all infractions except those minor
ones dealt with under summary punishment procedures.
After a CR number is assigned, the investigation proceeds
one of two ways. If the primary allegation is use of excessive
force, OPS, along with its civilian investigators, will be responsi-
ble for investigating the complaint. All other allegations, e.g.,
drug use, corruption, insubordination, intoxication, etc., are
forwarded to the Department's Internal Affairs Division (LAD),
which is staffed by sworn personnel, for investigation. This
separation empowers civilian employees to investigate com-
plaints of excessive force, the types of complaints that, as dis-
cussed earlier, are most crucial to the public. In recent years,
there have been approximately 8,000 CR numbers issued annu-
ally." Typically, one-third are retained by OPS and two-thirds
are forwarded to IAD.5 It should be noted that in contrast to
some other departments, Chicago's unwritten practice is very
open to accepting formal complaints. Vn-tually any complaint
alleging a violation of the Department's rules is logged in and
assigned for follow-up investigation, even if the allegation ap-
pears minor, or far-fetched. By contrast, the Los Angeles Police
Department had been accused of taking steps to deter com-
plaints, particularly excessive force complaints, from formally
entering its system. Tests done with volunteer complainants in-
dicated one-third of these persons were actively discouraged
from lodging their complaints.I Chicago has committed a sub-
stantial number of personnel to this intake and complaints pro-
cess: OPS has had approximately eighty-five authorized staff
CriYOF CmcAGo PoLIcE BOARD, 1993-1994 BIANNUAL REPORT 7.
65Id.
6 WARREN CHRISTOPHER, REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON THE Los
ANGELES PoucE DEPARTMENT 158-59 (1991). This organizational practice of discour-
aging complaints is further underscored by that department's initial lack of interest
in receiving the videotape of the beating of Rodney King for investigation. See
SKOLNIcK & Fmz, supra note 7, at 2-3.
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members and LAD one-hundred during the period covered in
this study.67
Whether the complaint is investigated by IAD or OPS, a
similar procedure is followed.ss The investigator conducts a
comprehensive investigation: interviewing the witnesses and the
accused, obtaining crime lab analyses, medical records, photos,
etc., as appropriate. The investigator also documents adminis-
trative due process requirements, such as informing the accused
of his/her right to seek legal counsel and the inadmissibility of
any statement in any subsequent criminal proceeding. One of
four possible dispositions is then made: (1) sustained (one or
more rules of the Department were violated); (2) not sustained
(the allegation could be neither proven nor disproven); (3) un-
founded (the incident simply did not occur); or (4) exonerated
(the action did occur, but the accused's conduct was proper
under the circumstances) .69 If a "sustained" finding is entered,
the investigator recommends a disciplinary penalty, taking into
account all the circumstances, including the accused's past
complementary and disciplinary record. The penalties range
from a reprimand through separation (demotion is not an op-
tion in the Chicago system). Findings of "not sustained," "ex-
onerated," or "unfounded," denote that the burden of proof
could not be met, and thus no disciplinary action can be taken,
thereby terminating the process.
A lengthy internal review process follows. 7  This includes
the Command Channel review, in which supervisors review the
file and either endorse the findings of the investigators or rec-
ommend changes. For the most common police position, pa-
trol officer, this channel includes review by the officer's district
67 Cry OF CHICAGO 1995 BUDGET RECOMMENDATIONS 143-44.
6' The various steps in the internal investigative and review process are detailed in
CH CAGO POLICE DEP'T., GENERAL ORDER 93-3: COMPLAINT AND DISCIPLINARY
PROCEDURES.
69 A survey of numerous police departments concluded that these same four cate-
gories are invariably used in labeling the dispositions of internal investigations, al-
though the terms "substantiated/not substantiated" are sometimes used in place of
"sustained/not sustained." ChILIAN COMPLAINT INVESTIGATIVE BUREAU, POLICE DEPT.,
CIY OF NEWYORK, SURVEy OF CIvmiAN COMPLAiNT SYSTEMS 71 (Sept., 1992).70See CHICAGO POLICE DEP'T., supra note 68.
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commander, deputy chief of patrol, chief of patrol, and first
deputy superintendent. Any of these parties may return the
matter for additional investigation should they discern a short-
coming in the investigative file. This does in fact happen; it is
not simply a theoretical option. The head of OPS or IAD, as
appropriate, also reviews the file and may make a recommenda-
tion to change the finding or the penalty.
Following this review, the officer may opt to exercise his or
her right for a Complaint Review Panel hearing. This is essen-
tially a peer review process, in which three sworn members-
typically a police officer, sergeant, and lieutenant-review the
matter, hear brief oral presentations by the officer (usually ac-
companied by a union representative) and staff of either LAD or
OPS. The panel may either concur with the findings and rec-
ommended penalty, or suggest changes.
Thus far, all of these conclusions are only advisory. At the
end of this lengthy process, the Superintendent of Police, taking
into consideration all of these findings and recommendations,
makes a determination as to what disciplinary action shall be
taken, and issues a suspension order.
At this point the officer's options to appeal this disciplinary
action vary according to the severity of the discipline ordered by
the Superintendent of Police. If the discipline is a suspension
of five days or fewer, the officer will serve the penalty and then
may file a grievance under the terms of the City's contract with
the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP).
If a suspension of six through thirty days has been ordered,
the officer may file a grievance, or may instead appeal to the Po-
lice Board for a review of the matter. The Board is a civilian
oversight panel, composed of nine citizens appointed by the
Mayor with the consent of the City Council.7' The Board con-
ducts a paper review of the matter and may concur, reduce the
penalty, or overturn it entirely.72 The implementation of the
7 CI-nCAGO, ILL., CODE § 2-84-020 (1990).
"The Board's authority to conduct these Suspension Review proceedings derives
from Kropel v. Conlisk, 322 N.E.2d 793, 798 (Ill. 1975). For the Board's procedures for




penalty is stayed until the Police Board issues its decision. The
officer, if still dissatisfied with the penalty after a Police Board
review, still retains the right to then file a grievance.
If the Superintendent seeks a penalty of more than thirty
days suspension, he is usually seeking to discharge the officer.
In a small number of cases, a finite suspension of more than
thirty days is sought. In these instances, there is no Command
Channel Review or Complaint Review Panel.73 Full due process
rights come into play: the right to counsel, to receive pre-
hearing discovery materials, and the right to subpoena, exam-
ine, and cross-examine witnesses. Each member of the Board is
given a full transcript of the hearing to read. At their next ex-
ecutive session, they then decide on guilt, and, if guilty, may im-
pose a penalty of discharge or a lesser penalty.74 The city-union
contract specifically excludes separation cases from the jurisdic-
tion of the grievance process.75 However, discharges may be
appealed through a suit in civil court.76
This lengthy summary of the disciplinary process illustrates
a key fact: before disciplinary action is taken against a Chicago
police officer, the matter in dispute has been through a very
complex investigative process with numerous points for review.
A decision to suspend an officer is not made in haste. It comes
only at the end of an exhaustive process often spread over many
months. Of the 33,998 investigations completed by OPS and
LAD during the period 1990-1993, 7060, or 21% of the total,
were categorized as sustained.77
73 CHICAGO, ILL., CODE § 2-84-030 (1990).
7' See CHICAGO PoucE DEP'T., supra note 72, at 28-34.
SeeAgreement, supra note 46, § 9.1 at 13-14.
7 6 These suits are brought under the authority of the ADMINISRATIVE REVIEW ACT,
735 ILCS 5/3-101 to -5/3-113 (West 1998).
CHICAGO POUCE DEP'T., SUPERINTENDENT'S REPORT TO THE POLICE BOARD (Jan,
1991); CHICAGO POLICE DEP'T., SUPERmTENDENT'S REPORT TO THE POUCE BOARD (Jan.
1992); CICAGO POLICE DEP'T., SUPERINTENDENT'S REPORT TO THE POLICE BOARD (Jan.
1993); CHICAGO POLICE DEP'T., SUPERINTENDENT'S REPORT TO THE POLICE BOARD (Jan.
1994).
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VI. ARBITRATIONS IN CHICAGO 1990-1993
As noted above, arbitration newsletters report on only those
arbitration decisions deemed particularly significant. The ready
availability of these publications has in turn helped to define the
data which scholars and practitioners then utilize for their stud-
ies. Decisions which turn solely on weighing evidence in factual
disputes are, as a rule, explicitly excluded from these newslet-
ters' compilations. Yet these are the vast majority of cases facing
an organization. How do such numerous decisions impact a
large organization?
The following analysis is based on an examination of all ar-
bitration decisions arising from disciplinary actionss affecting
sworn Chicago police personnel, handed down from January,
1990 through December, 1993. The Chicago Police Depart-
ment's strength was in excess of 12,000 sworn officers during
this period.7 Of these, perhaps 10,000 were below the rank of
sergeant and therefore were members of the current collective
bargaining unit, the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP). Through
the FOP contract with the City of Chicago, these officers may
grieve disciplinary actions involving suspensions of thirty days or
less. Those of sergeant's rank or higher do not have that op-
tion, as the F.O.P.'s membership, for the purposes of its collec-
tive bargaining agreement, is defined as comprising those below
the rank of sergeantSO
The Department's Management and Labor Affairs Section
received and distributed copies of all arbitration decisions is-
sued during the four years of this study. The following data
were all tabulated from those arbitrations. During these four
years, arbitrators handed down decisions resolving 328 individ-
ual suspensions of officers. These officers had been suspended
for a total of 1584 days. The average disciplinary action was for
7 Grievances pertaining to non-disciplinary issues, such as transfers, disputes over
selection of vacation periods, etc., were excluded from this analysis.
See, e.g., CmcAGo PoucE DEARTENT, BIENNIALREPORT 1993 & 1994, at 47.
'8 See Agreement, supra note 46, art. 2 at 1. Recently, supervisors (sergeants, lieu-
tenants, and captains) gained the right to be represented for collective bargaining
purposes. In the future, it is likely a separate agreement covering these employees
will allow them to grieve, but currently (Feb. 1999), no such agreement is in effect.
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a suspension of approximately five days. The range of actions
grieved ran from a one day suspension through thirty days.1
There were no reprimands that were the subject of arbitration
decisions. In all of these cases, the penalties had been served
before the arbitrations took place. The arbitrators' decisions in
this system, therefore, came after the fact and took one of three
forms: (1) affirmed the full disciplinary penalty already ordered
and served; (2) overturned the suspension in full; or (3) upheld
the penalty in part (for example, in deciding a suspension of
five days, reduce the penalty to a suspension of three days and
overturn the remaining two days, for which the officer was then
awarded back pay).
Table I summarizes these arbitration outcome data. Of the
1584 total days of suspension presented to arbitrators, 794 were
upheld by the arbitrators, while 790 were overturned. For these
employees, their disciplinary records were amended to reflect
the arbitrators' decisions, and back pay awarded.
In the Chicago Police Department, suspension, by definition, means a suspen-
sion without pay. The author has read of instances in which other governmental
agencies suspend with pay employees accused of wrongdoing, pending a disciplinary
hearing. The rationale as to why one would in essence reward employees suspected




CHICAGO POLICE DISCIPLINARY ARBITRATION
RESULTS: 1990-1993
Year Number Total Days Days of Days of
of Cases of Suspension Suspension
Decided Suspension Upheld Overturned
Arbitrated
1990 64 256 116 140
1991 82 404 167 237
1992 105 615 379 236
1993 77 309 132 177
TOTAL 328 1,584 794 790
Source: Individual arbitration decisions, as provided by Management and Labor
Affairs Section, Chicago Police Department.
This result is striking. In the aggregate, the arbitrators "split
the baby" with almost perfect fifty-fifty precision. This was
done through a mixture of orders: 135 of the 328 decisions
(41%) upheld the Department's discipline in full; 133 (40%)
reversed the Department and awarded full back pay for the sus-
pensions at stake; and, in the remaining sixty cases (19%), there
were split findings.3
I then examined the distribution of arbitration outcomes by
arbitrator. A comprehensive review of the decisions indicated
82 When this phenomenon first attracted the author's attention, the split, though
close, was not quite as even. Every successive enhancement of the study-expansion of
the universe by adding another year's results, refinement of data, clarification of miss-
ing cases-has served only to narrow the gap.
a- For the purposes of this study, a suspension reduced to a written reprimand was
counted the same as if the suspension had been overturned completely and no disci-
plinary action ordered. A reprimand causes no immediate monetary loss; its other
ramifications are in general very limited. This is a reasonable assumption within the
context of the Chicago Police Department. Different norms prevail elsewhere; for
example, in the U.S. armed forces, a written reprimand in one's file can have serious
consequences for one's career.
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that during the relevant time span, three persons handled the
vast majority of the arbitrations-285 of the 328, or 87%. A few
cases involved penalties of ten or more days. The bulk of these
cases, however, typically involved lesser penalties-suspensions
of one through five days. Almost all were decided under a pro-
cess known as "fast track," in which an arbitrator might hear two
cases per day for three consecutive days each month and issue
written decisions later. Each side presents its case without using
attorneys. Oral arguments and witnesses' testimony focus al-
most exclusively on attempting to ascertain the factual context
of the underlying incident. These "fast track" cases are precisely
the type explicitly excluded from compilation in nationally re-
ported series.8 Although these three arbitrators decided 87%
of the cases, these arbitrations constituted only 59% of the days
of discipline at stake.
Table II details the results of arbitration by arbitrator. The
remaining 13% of the cases determined the outcome of 652
days of discipline-41% of the total. A number of arbitrators
decided these cases, with no one or two persons dominant. A
minority of these cases were also "fast track" arbitrations. The
bulk of these remaining cases were "full" arbitrations. These of-
ten dealt with longer suspensions, usually from ten through
thirty days. These more serious cases tended to be more in-
tensely contested. Typically, the hearings were longer; multi-day
proceedings were not uncommon. An Assistant Corporation
Counsel would present the Department's position; a union at-
torney would represent the officer. In contrast to the "fast-
track" cases, procedural arguments accompanied the factual tes-
timony. Many of these suspensions of thirty days or less had
previously been upheld by the Police Board through appellate-
style paper reviews.
"4 See supra, text accompanying note 58.
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TABLE II
ARBITRATION RESULTS, BY ARBITRATOR: 1990 - 1993
Arbitrator Number Total Days of Days of Days of
of Cases Suspension Suspension Suspension
Decided Arbitrated Upheld Overturned
Doe 91 271 123 148
Jones 101 389 271 118
Smith 93 272 119 153
All Others 43 652 281 371
TOTAL 328 1,584 794 790
Source: Individual arbitration decisions, Management and Labor Affairs Sec-
tion, Chicago Police Department
No one arbitrator's decisions split with the same fifty-fifty
precision noted in Table I. Only the collective outcome of all
arbitrators combined produced that effect.
There is another, separate, pool of data which reinforces
this pattern. In recent years, there has been a growth in the
number of grievances filed, leading to a substantial backlog of
open cases. In an effort to reduce this backlog and deal with
grievances in a more timely manner, both labor and manage-
ment agreed to participate in what are known as summary re-
views. In this process, an arbitrator is given a Complaint
Register file, with no additional motions, pleadings, or other
materials filed by either side. The arbitrator reviews the mate-
rial and issues an advisory decision, stating, in essence, "based
on the material now available, if this came to me as an arbitra-
tion, I would probably decide as follows." Under this process,
the arbitrator's conclusions are advisory and not binding. In
theory, either party can opt to pursue the matter to binding ar-
bitration. In practice, this does not occur. The arbitrator's ad-
visory opinion gives both sides an unambiguous message as to
what is likely to occur if the matter is pursued to arbitration.
1998]
MARK!IPS
Therefore, both sides almost always agree to accept and imple-
ment the arbitrator's advice.
The results of these advisory opinions, by arbitrator, are
presented in Table III. These data comprise the universe of all
such advisories issued, from the inception of this process
through July, 1995. These cases are wholly separate from those
summarized in Tables I and II.
TABLE III
ADVISORY OPINION RESULTS, BY ARBITRATOR:
JANUARY 1994-JULY 1995
Arbitrator Number Total Days of Days of Days of
of Cases Suspension Suspension Suspension
Decided Under Upheld Overturned
Advisement
Doe 53 245 129 116
Jones 45 248 177 71
Smith 107 530 209 321
TOTAL 205 1,023 515 508
Source: Arbitrators' summary reviews, Management and Labor Affairs Section,
Chicago Police Department.
Again, with almost perfect precision, the aggregate results
are evenly split. This is all the more striking because the pro-
portion of days of discipline reviewed by each arbitrator in this
set of data is different from the profile in Table II. For exam-
ple, Arbitrator Smith, the most pro-union of the three arbitra-
tors, was responsible for deciding only 17.2% of the days of
discipline tallied in Table II, but was responsible for 51.8% of
the discipline summarized in Table III. Arbitrator Doe had
17.1% of the total days in Table II, but 23.9% of the total days in
Table HI. Despite these differences, the net results are virtually
identical.
At first glance, one might assume the overall split of deci-
sions demonstrates the fairness and impartiality of the arbitra-
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tors' collective wisdom. However, looking more closely at the
disciplinary process makes this a difficult proposition to accept.
As discussed previously, the process leading to the suspension of
an officer is an intensive one. That, in turn, suggests that arbi-
trators' decisions are collectively far more evenly split than one
might reasonably expect. If one accepts this proposition, then
the key question is why do these decisions divide as they do? A
number of observations can be made, some of which serve only
to reinforce the conclusion that the distribution observed here
is a very unusual one.
First, before a suspension reaches the grievance filing stage,
note the elaborate investigative and internal review process
summarized above. A CR file will lead to disciplinary action
against an officer only if it has jumped over all of these hurdles.
As noted earlier, almost 80% of the complaints investigated are
winnowed out through this process.5 Those which remain are
not marginal cases. Management is unlikely to impose disci-
pline on those cases seen as weak from its perspective. Con-
versely, this review process does not give FOP an opportunity to
drop those cases which are weakest from its perspective. Thus,
the surviving cases should be relatively strong ones from the
managerial perspective. It therefore seems more reasonable to
expect that a group of outside arbitrators would support the
disciplinary actions, not 50% of the time, but at a much higher
rate.
Secondly, after a grievance is filed, for the Department to
prevail in an arbitration, it may be necessary for police man-
agement to call witnesses. Given those with whom police offi-
cers have their most frequent contacts, witnesses crucial to the
Department's cases are often drawn from the underclass-fel-
ons, prostitutes, etc. As a practical matter, the delay from when
a citizen's complaint was filed until an arbitration is held often
makes it very difficult to locate these witnesses and then induce
them to testify. As it is the Department's burden to convince
the arbitrator that just cause exists for imposing discipline, wit-
ness unavailability is usually far more crucial to police manage-
See supra note 77.
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ment than to the grieving officer. If it is clear that the necessary
witnesses are not available, the Department will therefore not
pursue a grievance to arbitration, but instead may resolve the
matter through negotiation. Cases resolved through negotia-
tion are thus typically the weakest ones from the Police Depart-
ment's perspective. These pre-arbitration case resolutions are
not reflected in Table I. Their removal from the universe of
cases examined makes this even split all the more striking.
From the other direction, the union may similarly decide
not to press to full arbitration the cases it perceives as weak.
While the costs of "fast-track" arbitrations are split between the
police department and the union, the collective bargaining
agreement provides that the party losing an arbitration must pay
the arbitrator's fees and expenses. This can be costly in a multi-
day, adversarial case. In a split decision, these costs are divided
between the two parties. From a strictly financial perspective, it
is therefore clearly in a party's interest to settle a weak case be-
fore arbitration, so as to avoid being tagged with the arbitrator's
bill.
The net, cumulative effect of these factors is unidirectional:
to leave in the pool of suspensions actually ordered, and pro-
ceeding to the arbitration stage those cases which are strong
from management's perspective, and to remove from the uni-
verse of cases those disciplinary actions which are relatively
weak.
VII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
What then accounts for these results? The most obvious
explanation is difficult to accept, for it calls into question the
very integrity and impartiality that are key parts of the concep-
tual foundation of arbitration. The selection of who will serve as
an arbitrator depends upon the willingness of both parties to a
dispute (or in this study, series of disputes) to accept that indi-
vidual as an arbitrator. Those arbitrators whom labor perceives
as strongly pro-management, or vice versa, will over time find
themselves not being selected to serve as arbitrators. Thus, it is
in the self-interest of the individual arbitrators to project an im-
age of impartiality. It may be that being perceived as even-
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handed in terms of the results of decisions takes precedence
over impartiality in viewing the evidence in the various cases.
Alternatively, arbitrators may strongly internalize the norm
of impartiality. In doing so, handing down decisions which
support one side 80% of the time may implicitly be viewed as
too partisan, even if that side consistently has stronger cases to
present. Does the concept of impartiality necessitate even-
handed distribution of outcomes? Elkouri and Elkouri, a stan-
dard work in the arbitration literature, recognizes the possibility
of splitting awards, but comments that "[p]ossibly there has
been too much concern over this matter."m The same authors,
however, while noting arbitrators as a group reject this practice,
nonetheless concede its possibility has been recognized.
These explanations are not wholly satisfactory. If it is in the
arbitrators' self-interest to be perceived as reasonably even-
handed, then the difference between the decisions of Arbitrator
Jones versus those of Arbitrators Doe and Smith is difficult to
explain. Doe's and Smith's patterns, while pro-police officers,
are not so far removed from an even split to cause them to be
perceived as solidly favoring one side. Jones, however, sup-
ported management's position approximately 70% of the time
(based on proportion of days of suspension upheld in both arbi-
trations and summary reviews). While his individual position,
strongly pro-police management, is cancelled out by the more
moderately pro-police union decisions of his colleagues, he is
nonetheless conspicuous in terms of his net results. This has
not, however, jeopardized his position; he continues to be one
of the designated arbitrators for these matters.
In the end, the metaphor that occurs to me to explain these
results is drawn from a long-time exhibit at Chicago's Museum
of Science and Industry. The exhibit illustrated probability dis-
tribution at work. A vertical display of two parallel sheets of
glass, several inches apart, had a bell shaped curve drawn upon
each sheet. Steel balls spewed down between the sheets from
above, with horizontal pegs between the two sheets serving to
" See ELKOuI & ELKOuRI, supra note 1, at 125-26.
s7 Rd at 125.
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deflect the balls from side to side as they descended, much as a
ball in a pinball machine is bounced around. Each ball would
eventually fall into one of several slots formed by vertical divid-
ers under the curves. As the quantity of balls mounted, they
sorted themselves into the vertical compartments under the
drawing of the bell curve, with the greatest concentration in the
center slot, and the numbers tailing off to either side. No one
ball had any knowledge of where any of the other balls had
gone, but the net result was clear: they somehow sorted them-
selves out into a consistent pattern of a normal distribution un-
der a bell shaped curve.
Are arbitration decisions similarly "motivated?" I have no
information suggesting that each of these arbitrators keeps rec-
ord of the distribution of either his own decisions, or those of
his colleagues. The decisions allow one to tabulate only results,
not motives or philosophical approach to these grievances.
Nonetheless, just as the steel balls sorted themselves out, so too
these arbitration decisions assumed a distinct and uniform pat-
tem of distribution.
If in fact what has been presented here is indicative of some
arbitrary process at work, then there are many serious ramifica-
tions. First and foremost, it tells all those with a stake in the dis-
ciplinary process-the accused officer, the complainant (be it a
citizen or fellow officer/supervisor), police management, union
staff, IAD/OPS investigators, etc.-that their efforts may well be
for naught. A suspension may be overturned or upheld, not be-
cause of the weakness of the evidence or the strength of the in-
vestigation, but because of chance. While the aggregate results
are clear, the results for any one case are unpredictable.
A pattern of such results can have a subtle but pernicious ef-
fect upon a police department's disciplinary process over time.
This, in turn, has serious implications for a police department
and its relations with the public. It erodes the deterrent value
of discipline, both for the affected officer and his/her col-
leagues. The insular nature of the police subculture ensures
that awareness of arbitration decisions will likely be high among
both the rank and file and their supervisors. When an officer,
whose misconduct is proven in an internal investigation and
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whom the Superintendent finds it necessary to discipline, none-
theless successfully evades any penalty, citizens may under-
standably lose confidence in the ability of the police department
to control its own personnel.
Information drawn from other police jurisdictions is am-
biguous, but suggests a similar process is at work. In Houston,
during the period from September 1, 1985 through December
29, 1988, arbitrators reversed forty-seven police disciplinary ac-
tions, upheld sixty actions, and modified forty-eight. It is un-
clear how many arbitrators accounted for these results, and
what level of penalty needed to be met for an action to qualify
for arbitration.8 Nonetheless, the numbers suggest a pattern
not unlike the results noted for Chicago.
While the facts of the arbitration decisions' distribution are
quite clear, the explanations are more ambiguous. Nonetheless,
the pattern is so striking and so uniform as to raise serious ques-
tions relative to the merits of the entire arbitration process. If
these findings could be replicated through studies of pools of
decisions from other jurisdictions, arbitration may indeed be
suspected of being arbitrary. Non-replicability could help to fo-
cus attention on those factors unique to Chicago which led to
the results reported here.
Given the entrenched position binding arbitration now
holds as the preferred means of resolving grievances under col-
lective bargaining agreements, it is not clear what type of an al-
ternative to arbitration could both feasibly be used to replace
arbitration and avoid the apparent tendency to split awards
documented here. However, the current absence of a viable op-
tion should not deter one from facing the very real prospect
that the system now in place appears to have a very crucial
drawback.
For professional arbitrators, it is an article of faith that they
decide issues before them in a fair and impartial manner, based
on the evidence in front of them. Impartiality has been deemed
the most important criterion for an arbitrator.89 These results,
8 See Friedman, supra note 31.
See ELKOuRi& ELKOUI, supra note 1, at 140.
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however, suggest that the words "arbitration" and "arbitrary"
share a common root for good reason.
